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TRANSCRIPT: PRESENTATION ON EXPLOITATION AND INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY IN
AI HEALTHCARE
Presented By: Charlotte Tschider1

The Journal of Law and Health’s
Digital Health & Technology Symposium
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL COLLEGE OF LAW
FRIDAY, APRIL 8, 2022
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Professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law
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The following is a transcription from The Digital Health and Technology
Symposium presented at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law by The Journal of
Law & Health on Friday, April 8, 2022. This transcript has been lightly edited for
clarity.
Charlotte A. Tschider:
First of all, it's wonderful to be amongst such fantastic scholars. I am so
thankful to the students and the organizers of this publication. It is a great privilege
to be able to discuss these topics with folks who are deep in figuring out what the
right solutions might be.
I wanted to share a little bit of background about how I have gone down this
path before I jump into the details. Dr. Krista Kennedy, of Syracuse University, and
myself have worked extensively on analyzing the relationships between individuals
and devices, especially pervasively attached devices like hearing aids.
As part of that research, we combed through blog posts, communications
between data scientists and others in organizations. As we did this, we realized the
concept of “datafication,” which is the digital rendering of a person as
representative of data. For example, if you have a person’s data, that independent
data might be treated differently than if a human being is sitting in front of you. We
saw the concept of datafication in blog entries, where data scientists attempted to
use as much data as possible or create devices to collect as much environmental
data or as much behavioral data as possible.2
Something did not sit quite right about this practice in the context of medical
devices. Many individuals are dependent on medical devices. This begs the
question – will the medical device offer better treatment or a better diagnosis than
we might have otherwise achieved without that same amount of data? Should we
have to have a corresponding negative impact to the individuals who use these
devices, even though the patient or their insurance have already paid for it?
These considerations brought me to question: what does exploitation look
like in this space? And is it possible to connect the concepts of data loss and
excessive data use to this concept of patient exploitation?
To address these issues, I like to start with the technology. It is always super
exciting to discuss the underlying technology. We have smart hearing aids and
insulin pumps. There are a lot of diagnostic efforts around the imaging space.
There are also many surgical robots; some that are more complex and some that are
more specific for a particular purpose. Artificial intelligence is not something far
2
For more information on “datafication” see e.g. Margarita Shilova, The Concept of
Datafication; Defination & Examples, DATA SCIENCE CENTRAL, (June 2, 2018, 1:30 p.m.)
https://www.datasciencecentral.com/the-concept-of-datafication-definition-amp-examples/.
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off in the future, it is something we're using today. So, the issues associated with it
are things that we really need to prioritize and think about from a legal perspective
now. One of the biggest problems is that data is essential for the creation and
function of these devices.
In some cases, there may not be representative data which may lead to a
disproportionate impact on certain populations, including safety issues that affect
certain populations more than others. The idea is that data is essential to safety, and
for useful development of artificial intelligence, that data must be identifiable. We
often need this type of data over a long period of time, not just at a point in time.
As you can imagine, when you have a device that somebody wears for a long period
of time, seeing how effectively that device functions (for example how accurately
it predicts insulin dosages) over a period of time would be more valuable to future
product development than how it behaves and makes decisions at a specific point
in time.
So, we know that we need data. We know that we need representative data
over a long period of time. How do we achieve that while guarding against data
overuse that could trigger potential privacy risks? It is helpful to understand the size
and expansion of these big data set implementations that we are talking about and
what data could be most useful in these spaces.
The first type of data, of course, is medical data. This includes information
about individuals’ past medical procedures and different diagnoses, and this data is
very useful. Additionally, behavioral data about patients – what they eat every day,
who they interact with, how social they are, how active they are – can be
tremendously useful for something like insulin delivery. Kinetic data, like where
they are going and what situations they find themselves in, is particularly useful for
devices like hearing aids because we want hearing aids to easily adapt to a person's
environment. So, being able to sense and then actually analyze the data to
automatically adjust is an important part of how we design those devices.
Another big area of expansion is secondary use – how can we use data to
create new devices, how can we use data for other purposes. Pre-pandemic, I visited
a company in Finland that was looking to use data for multiple purposes. They had
collected data for a particular type of glaucoma test, but they thought they could
use it to predict Alzheimer’s Disease. However, they were not able to use the data
for those secondary purposes because they didn't have consent from the individuals,
which seems right to us. But there might be situations where a data reuse is actually
in the best interest of individuals. So how do we manage all these pieces?
Let’s start with the problems.
The first problem is the idea that we do not exactly have a traditional
fiduciary role with relation to A.I. technology. This can give you a sensation of a
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false trust. What I mean by this is: suppose you have a manufacturer creating an
A.I. technology, an individual who is using the A.I. technology, and a doctor in the
middle. Now, if the doctor doesn't really understand how the technology works,
then presenting potential privacy risks to that individual is going to be very difficult.
But because a doctor is prescribing the device, there is a sense of trust that comes
with that, and unfortunately, manufacturers benefit from that trust.
We also have the issue of sensitive data collection. Certainly, the types of
data we collect through many of these devices are not publicly available. We are
talking about very sensitive information. For devices that are always on like hearing
aids, you might be collecting information about the individuals a person associates
with. You might be collecting intimate details. There is a lot of information that can
be collected from a hearing aid that is not collected through traditional medical
records today.
Another problem is exigent health events and a lack of analog alternatives.
When a person is seeking use of an A.I. medical device, whether it's for a diagnostic
purpose, a treatment purpose, or it's a device that a person pervasively wears, they're
doing it often because it's the best option or because they must. This is not a
situation where we have discretionary choices – where somebody can simply
choose a different coffee maker. Unfortunately, when someone must choose
between their health and their privacy, they are usually going to choose health.
Even if we provide patients with all the information, the health choice is
almost always going to rank a little bit higher. Couple that with this idea that data
is so useful and so necessary that there is an incentive to collect more, we ultimately
have a lot of issues for the individual. The individual is sort of “riding in the
backseat,” and the technology is really riding up front. This means is that we have
a risk of exploitation – we are taking something from an individual and not really
compensating them for it.
Now, I do not necessarily believe that market solutions are the best way to
manage privacy. I think there are a lot of dangers in that. But basically, the idea is
that the act of taking someone’s data, of replicating their data, and then sharing their
data with third parties, when the individual is not aware of it or does not have
meaningful choice, can in and of itself be called a deontological risk, even if their
data is not misused on the back end and even if their data does not lead to some
significant cyber event, like identity theft.
And so, I think if we reframe this as an autonomy problem, we can
potentially get some solutions that are better than simply plugging in consent and
saying we're good with that. Consent really can't cure these issues because of all
the things that I have just talked about. Simply providing information is probably
not going to be accurate or informative enough to really motivate individual choice.
As I have written about in the past, we have major issues with consent anyway, in
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part because individuals are faced with so many privacy notices in their lives that
it is very difficult to comb through all of them and really understand the salience of
the potential privacy risks associated. When a collection and variety of different
behaviors exceed what we would consider our normatively accepted values for a
community, exploitation can result, and when there is exploitation, we should be
requiring organizations to do more to overcome that risk to individuals.
Let me describe an example of what data sharing can look like in an average
health care system. It all starts with device data, even if we're talking about
something simple like insulin pump function. That data goes between a variety of
organizations, from a clinical hospital, to the manufacturer, to the doctor, to A.I.
startups providing the A.I., which is also actually used by the manufacturer. A lot
of this data, eventually, will make its way to insurers or to joint ventures between
clinics, hospitals, and other third parties. In the center of it all, of course, you have
this doctor and patient. A lot of patients really don't understand the inner workings
of these details behind the scenes and how their data might be duplicated or used.
So really, the bottom line is that the potential risks in data sharing are really
difficult to communicate. And when we have complex A.I. systems, like
unsupervised deep learning systems or anything similar, unfortunately, those risks
are especially hidden in the data. There is an inherent opacity, and you have a
change in those algorithms developing over time, so even an explanation that could
help us in one moment will probably be different in the next moment as that A.I.
continues to change. How could we manage the situation in a way that is based on
information? A privacy notice for information that an individual must take into
account when they are presumably in a health situation where they're trying to make
a decision in the best interest of their health it is just not really a great fit.
One of the movements in privacy law recently, more generally than just
health, is the idea of an information fiduciary.3 The way this idea has been framed
is that individuals or organizations who receive personal information should act in
the best interest and in loyalty to that individual.4 And while I am a little bit
skeptical of how this could apply across the board for any consumer related
transactions, I do think that healthcare could benefit from an expanded conception
of the fiduciary role. It doesn't necessarily have to operate like existing fiduciaries.
However, one of the things that we must take into account is the idea that
there should be some type of relational duty. Because we might have a doctor in
the middle, but the doctor is not really somebody who can explain potential risks in
a way that is very salient. Or, they also are not really in a position to change the
3

For more information on “information fiduciaries” see e.g. Adam Schwartz & Cindy
Cohn, “information Fiduciaries Must Protect Your Data Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/10/information-fiduciariesmust-protect-your-data-privacy.
4
Id.
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nature of the technology or the nature of the data sharing that's occurring. So,
developing a relational duty between the manufacturer and the individual is really
important here.
One of the ways that we can think about doing this is by establishing the
role statutorily, under a health privacy statute. We have a variety of different state
laws that focus on healthcare privacy that extend HIPAA in some important ways.
We also have a variety of different technologies that do not actually fall under
HIPAA. Consumer healthcare devices, in particular, could be subject to health
privacy statutes, even where they wouldn't be subject to HIPAA requirements.
We could also consider ways to bolster risk assessment requirements. Under
HIPAA, for example, we do have a requirement to conduct risk assessments from
a privacy and security perspective.5 It would not be that difficult to add in an
additional risk assessment related to the potential for exploitation of downstream
patients. One of the things that I have talked about previously in my writing on
other projects is the idea of legitimate interest analysis.6 One of the ways we might
be able to overcome these limitations in consent is to focus on the legitimate interest
of the particular individual, a community of individuals, or potentially within the
public interest as a way of demonstrating that additional collection or data sharing
is going to be in the best interest of the individual.
Now, the most important part here is that you would have to publish this
somewhere, so that it can be inspected, whether that be by a separate regulatory
body or the general public. I think it is really important that if we are doing this
kind of analysis, it is published somewhere. There are many ways we can evaluate
legitimate interest here. We could think about resource availability. We could think
about representational data that could overcome potential discrimination issues.
There could be efficacy or safety concerns, but we want the potential legitimate
interest to outweigh the commercial interests of the organization. There are also
different methodologies that have been shared in the EU and other places that can
help us do this in a systematic risk assessment-oriented way.
The core question here is: is the data used primarily for the individual or is
it for the business? What should organizations do if they cannot demonstrate
legitimate interest? Well, we have some options and I think the best option is to use
de-identified data. Currently, I think a higher standard is needed than what HHS

5

Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Security Risk Assessment Tool, HEALTHIT.GOV,
https://www.healthit.gov/topic/privacy-security-and-hipaa/security-risk-assessmenttool#:~:text=A%20risk%20assessment%20helps%20your,PHI)%20could%20be%20at%20risk.
(June 3, 2022).
6
Charlotte A. Tschider, AI's Legitimate Interest: Towards a Public Benefit Privacy Model,
21 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 125 (2021).
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requires under the identification safe harbor.7 They certainly could use anonymized
data or synthetically-created data. You could purchase publicly available data sets
that are not protected health information. You could create research data sets
yourself and invest in that. You can rely on data donation or philanthropy of
individuals donating their information. And, finally, though maybe not the best
option, you could purchase data in these situations. There are plenty of ways we
can get around relying completely on individuals and poor tactics to swindle data
away from patients when patients really are dependent on good care and quality
health results.

7

For more information on “HHS Kickbak Rules” see e.g. Harold B. Hilborn, HHS Issues
Revisions to Safe Hornbors Under Anti0-Kickback Statute, THE NAT’L L. REV., (Mar. 5, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/hhs-issues-revisions-to-safe-harbors-under-anti-kickbackstatute.

448

